Transition and Leadership:
An Editorial
Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar
…the actual and present condition of Africa [Somalia] is one of deep
trouble, sometimes a deeper trouble than the worst imposed during
the colonial years.
Basil Davidson, The Blackman’s Burden, Time Books, 1992, p. 9.
Tell him that we do not wish for greediness
We do not wish that his ears should be hard of hearing
We do not wish that he should act arbitrarily…
R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution,
Oxford University Press, 1929, p. 82.
I. Introduction
Let’s begin with one fundamental assertion: We both feel deeply for
Somalia and its people—our people. In the heat of this moment, some
might dismiss such a sentiment as rather anachronistic. But even if
there is some grain of truth to that judgment, we hold firmly that the
instinct is a viable and deliberate mistiming commensurate with the
imperatives of the long durée. Our loyalty, therefore, is to no individual
or political group. On the contrary, we define ourselves as civic scholars
whose sole interest is to make whatever small contribution our modest
talents will allow to the revival of Somali national identity, dignity, and
purpose. This brief essay’s central concern, then, is the direction of the
country in the wake of the recent announcements of a new leadership
and political institutions. We offer these thoughts, though somewhat
melancholic in word and tone, with the hope that our compatriots will
use the new tidings as a potentially valuable development (albeit not
a tabula rasa as one would have wished for); that is, a fleeting opportunity to be used to move out of the current morass and positively forge
ahead towards an authentic renewal.
The essay is based on two temporalities: the bulk was written in the
immediate wake of the announcement of the new dispensation from
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Nairobi last autumn; part two, starting with the update, was authored
in early August 2005.
Somalia has been the only independent country without a national
government in modern times.1 Haunting images of warlords condemning multitudes of hapless people to artificial famine moved the United
States and the United Nations to intervene in 1992. Although the huge
military intervention was successful in saving hundreds of thousands
of Somalis from starvation, that effort failed to help the country reconstitute a national government. The chaos that ensued led to the departure of the international force. Subsequently, Somalia dropped off the
watch of the world, despite worsening human conditions throughout
the country. It is only after September 11 that it has regained some
attention, particularly from the United States—a concern that pivots
on preventing possible terrorists from finding a safe haven in the area.
The United States closely monitors the country despite the fact that the
original suspicion that Al-Qaida members were in the country had not
materialized.
For almost a decade, the only international commitment to help the
Somali people has been limited to meager humanitarian aid. It is only
in the last two years that the world community, led by the European
Union (EU), tried to aid Somalia’s so-called peace and reconciliation
process. Earlier, nearly a dozen attempts at peace had failed to produce
a national government. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization whose members consist of
Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda, spearheaded the latest peace conference, which lasted for two years (starting
October 2002). Unfortunately, incompetence, malfeasance, and the conflicting self-interest of some IGAD countries as well as officials of the
Conference itself practically ensured that warlords (the main culprits
responsible for the suffering of the Somali people) and corrupt politicians and their mainly illiterate clients dominated the process and
appointed members of the Transitional Parliament and cabinet ministers. Simultaneously, civic groups, individuals, and professionals who
did not partake in the destruction of the country and who invested
heavily in peacemaking and reconstruction have been systematically
excluded. Certain members of the IGAD, particularly Ethiopia and
others who supported the process, have acted as unabashed partisans
rather than honest facilitators and mediators.2 Regrettably, they used
their authority to undermine the integrity of the process. On their part,
the civic groups and professionals also failed to organize and mount a
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challenge to the modalities of the peace conference and the fate of their
country.
II. IGAD: A Failure and the Need for a Somali Social Contract
The outcome of the IGAD approach to Somali peace has been to empower
the warlords and enfeeble the rest. Consequently, warlords maneuvered
the selection of members of the new Parliament, including appointing
many from among their retinues. Most MPs, however, were not necessarily beholden or accountable to anyone and were ready to offer their
votes to the highest bidder.3 Only a few of the MPs have respected
their solemn oath to uphold the Draft Charter. As one keen Swedish
diplomatic observer of the peace process noted a few months earlier,
“Somalia will have a government of warlords and a parliament most of
whose members are illiterate.” That prognosis has begun to unfold.
On October 10, 2004, the Transitional Parliament selected Colonel
Abdillahi Yusuf as President from a roster of candidates. Col. Yusuf’s
ascendance might not bode well for the future of the transition, given
his record as a leader of the Northeast region (Puntland) and as a client
of Ethiopia since the late 1970s. Although Mr. Yusuf had earned a great
deal of credit for courageously standing up to Siyaad Barre’s dictatorship, he has a long and disturbing history in Somalia and in his home
region, where he acted as a ruler. For instance, he is known to have
made a mockery of political ethics, betrayed an appetite for cruel arbitrariness, and ran a maladroit administration. After the collapse of the
Siyaad Barre regime, the Northeast region of Somalia made impressive
progress to restore peace and take tentative measures to create a democratic regional order. These advances were reversed when Col. Yusuf
came to power on July 23, 1998. The Council of Elders who appointed
him removed him from office due to both a poor performance by his
administration and the expiration of his tenure. He declined to accept
the verdict and reclaimed power through force.4 Further, there are
many allegations that he has intimidated opponents to such an extent
that some fled the region, such as the former Chief Justice of the region
of Puntland. Others are reported to have been eliminated.5 Col. Yusuf’s
close alliance with Ethiopia was revealed by the surfacing of a video in
2002 that showed him admitting to receiving support from Ethiopia in
his attempt to retake power and consolidate his personal rule. He has
also publicly articulated sectarian and clanistic ideas (e.g., a videotape
captures Mr. Yusuf claiming that the town of Kismayo belongs to the
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Harti kin group alone) that will not endear him to Somalis from other
kin groups. In short, his record does not inspire confidence and, in fact,
makes Somalia’s new transition worrisome.
III. What Now? Public Atonement and More
In spite of this dismaying background, there is a real opportunity to
change course and begin a new chapter. Somalis and many in the
international community are eager to witness the end of Somalia’s
nightmare. But this yearning should not be an excuse to avoid taking
stock of the illegitimacy of the Conference, the abysmal quality of most
of the MPs and cabinet members, and the profile of the transitional
leadership. The proceedings in Nairobi were neither about genuine
power-sharing nor designed as a peace process. There is overwhelming evidence that it was ineptly organized and managed,6 and that the
selections of delegates and, ultimately, members of the new Parliament
and Cabinet were, at best, highly irregular. The daunting question,
then, is this: Can such an inflated number of Parliamentarians (275) and
Cabinet (over 90), and a President whose public record is blemished by clanist
and harsh personal rule, effectively shepherd reconciliation, lawful authority,
and national revival?
We pointed out, when the original version of this essay was written
in October 2004, that most Somalis were willing to conditionally support a peace-making and reconstruction period under the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), despite the sinister machinations that produced the dispensation. We proffered a minimum of six major conditions under which public support might jumpstart a new and worthy
social contract:
• Public atonement—that is, a clear admission of past grave misdeeds
of the leaders, starting with the Transitional President and members
of Parliament (Toobad keen and Cafis). Such a posture must include a
request for forgiveness;7
• A legally binding undertaking that the regime will manage the transitional process peacefully, democratically, transparently, and in
observation of the law and protection of human rights;
• Articulate a vision for the country that explains the great challenges
of the present and then sets the direction and main particularities of
the new time;
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• Create a lean (no more than a dozen) cabinet and ambassadorial
appointments of men and women who are highly qualified and
competent;
• Ensure that the National Commissions (i.e., reconciliation, constitution, civil service, etc.) be formed transparently and professionally,
and are led by a nonpartisan group;
• Formally and urgently make a request to the African Union (AU)
for the immediate creation of a high-powered commission (South
Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria) with a significant nonpartisan Somali
membership to guide the peaceful reconciliation between the Northwest region (Somaliland) and the Transitional Federal Government.
The above might not be enough, but nothing short of these acts and
promises will inspire wide public trust for the transition. To make certain that this new social contract is honored, the inception of a national
watchdog group with international representation from the EU, U.S.A.,
AU, and U.N. that will monitor deviations from these principles is
absolutely necessary. A clear signal of the character of the TFG, and particularly the thinking and vision of the Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed
Geedi, is how and what type of senior administrators are selected.8
One of the essential characteristics of the Siyaad regime was a nefarious nepotism in the appointment of people to key positions in the government. Recent regional administrations and the defunct TNG had
adopted that practice: many of the top people around the leaders of
these operations are/were unqualified and clanistic hucksters or mere
cronies. This has created a political culture in which primarily kin and
sycophants are trusted and rewarded. Such privatization of civic space
has deflated the people’s credence in public affairs and enervated collective ownership of the commons. The first acid test of the new transitional federal leadership is whether they will bring on board a cadre
of professionally skilled Somalis, who are neither related nor beholden
to them, as top managers in the new administrative apparatuses of the
state.
Would this transitional period begin to heal the deep wounds of the civil
war and overcome the dictatorial legacy of the old regime and the nightmare
of warlord tyranny, given the dearth of skilled and committed people in the
Parliament and government leadership? The old pattern of failure can be
circumvented only if at least five factors are tightly interwoven:
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• First, the new leaders commit themselves to the aforementioned
principles of the new social contract.
• Second, given the transitional regime’s desperate need for material
support, the international community, particularly the EU, which
has been the main supporter of the Conference in Nairobi, must
play a decisive role to ensure that the militias are fully disarmed
and a professional and effective police force is established. In addition, the expected bankers of the transition must also demand that
civic groups and professionals play a strategic role in re-establishing
major public institutions. These two acts would trigger confidence
in the transition.
• Third, such bold interventions would convince a fragmented and
disoriented public that the world community is seriously committed
to sustained peace and reconstruction. Without such a concrete and
resilient cue from the international community, a vulnerable public
would have little reason to expose itself to the risk of confronting
leaders who have a poor civic record.
• Fourth, skilled Somalis inside the country and in the diaspora must
rise to the challenge of the transition if they get an opportunity to
use their talents to rebuild the country. These groups are likely to
enthusiastically respond to the call if the international community
strategically involves them in rebuilding public institutions.
• Finally, Somalis of goodwill will rally behind the transition if the
promised aid to the country is used to support local entrepreneurs
and NGOs, and to nurture local ownership of the transition. On
the contrary, Somalis will not actively endorse the new dispensation if foreign consultants and international NGOs dominate the
reconstruction. Many have learned sharply negative lessons in these
years of political wilderness characterized by demeaning manipulations by external hands.
It is not an exaggeration to suggest that the Somali people, particularly the civic and professional elements, have been hostages in their
own home. Since the withdrawal of the U.S. and U.N. troops from the
country in 1995, the world community has told Somalis that assistance
will flow in only after they have freed themselves. The irony is that the
international community, in taking this stance, guaranteed the paramountcy of the warlords. It would seem that the IGAD strategy, supported by the international community, prioritized brokering a deal
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between the merchants of violence and clanism. The outcome of the
selection process indicates that, at best, only partial power-sharing has
been achieved. Consequently, peace can only be sustainable and reconciliation feasible if and only if a significant proportion of the population
is convinced that the transition will progressively lead to a complete
restoration of citizens’ rights. It is unlikely that the emergent leaders
would, on their own initiative, put into place and monitor a process of
democratization that would steadily empower the country’s citizens.
Such a possibility is clouded by the wrongful and undemocratic methods employed to select members of key organs of the anticipated state.
The only recipe that has the prospect of transforming tyranny and
chaos into an evolving democracy in Somalia is if the leaders of the
regime solemnly accept the principles of the social contract and if that
is resolutely backed by the international community.
The new dispensation has two major assets that could be productive if intelligently utilized. First, most of the public has learned to
fend for itself, albeit at a low level of subsistence, without state support during the last two decades. Such existential self-reliance could
mean that a talented and committed state leadership could chart a new
public-private partnership, instead of the state dominating the reconstruction process. This strategy will have the advantage of tapping into
entrepreneurial and survival skills Somalis have honed over the last
twenty years, as well as attract professionals whose major concern is to
effectively rebuild their country. To assemble this project will require a
mature and ambitious leadership—one that is not afraid to single out
talent and the nation’s best and brightest to serve. Second, the Somali
people seem eager to leave behind the horror of the last twenty years.
They would support the new order if it can deliver peace and justice.
The glaring conundrum is whether the current crop of MPs and government leaders are credible and astute enough to capitalize on this
occasion and commence the journey of rebirth.
IV. A Recapitulation
Confidence building is vital and the principles sketched above are critical to generate trust. A public admission by the new leaders of their
past serious wrongs and an appeal for forgiveness alone can provide
a minimum basis for initiating the people’s faith in the transition. The
second major initiative that would boost public confidence is for the
Transitional President to courageously acknowledge that he does not
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have the credibility to deal with the Northwest (Somaliland) due to his
past violent intervention in the Sool and Sanaag regions, and his clanist
rantings. Consequently, a high-powered African Commission (outside
IGAD) should be set up to mediate this potentially catastrophic difficulty. Third, the new regime should commit itself to a legally binding contract that will ensure transparency, freedom of expression, real
democratization, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Fourth, the
international community’s attentive and effective engagement with
reconstruction is indispensable.
A recent survey (October 2004) of African citizens unequivocally
illustrated that the regimes in the continent have been a heartbreaking
disappointment.9 Similarly, the partisan role of IGAD and its baneful mismanagement of the Somali conference exposes again the bankruptcy of national and regional elites. IGAD’s legacy will be a dark
one—too fraudulent and inept to have a meaningful role in regional
affairs. Simultaneously, the leaders of the new Somali dispensation
must realize that the era when dictatorial and deceitful leaders could
intimidate or hoodwink the public is over. The nation’s as well as the
leaders’ only salvation is for the latter to repent, reject being vassals of
another state, and lead ethically and ably.10 The alternative is the perpetuation (for all of us) of the curse of political squalor, mutual predation, international contempt, and abuse.
V. Update
Eight months have elapsed since we authored this brief essay and sufficient evidence has accumulated to warrant a provisional assessment of
events since last October. We think all the six conditions—which could
have provided a basis for a new social contract and, subsequently,
inject kinetic energy that boosts public optimism about the transition
and the TFG leaders—are yet to gain the attention of the leadership.
The two exceptions here might be the Speaker of the Parliament, Shariff Hassan Sh. Aden, and a significant number of MPs, who insist on
the importance of peaceful reconciliation and who have pushed for
Mogadishu’s demilitarization and the deployment of an African force
(excluding Ethiopia). In contrast, the President and his allies remain
adamant about several key issues:
• He insists on the inclusion of Ethiopian troops in the AU security
force. This posture flies in the face of the strong feelings of the
majority of Somalis. The reasons behind such a disapproval include
8
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the known fact that Ethiopia is President Yusuf’s external patron
and, for some even more bitter to swallow, the history of Ethiopia’s
treatment of Somali people in what used to be called the Ogaden
region of Ethiopia.
• He and his Prime Minister have created a cabinet that is bewilderingly expansive and bereft of proven records of competence.
• He has acted unconstitutionally by trying to usurp the duties of the
Speaker of the Parliament.
• He considers members of the Cabinet to be “false” ministers—in his
own language, Wasiiro beenbeena—without realizing that he is their
leader.
• His public and private utterances have been contradictory and laced
with bellicose verbiage and clanistic intimations.
• He has declared his intention to use his militias to invade Mogadishu and forcefully disarm his competitors.
• Neither President Yusuf nor Prime Minister Geedi have addressed
the Somali public or offer an inclusive roadmap to peace and the
vital role the citizenry can play in reconciliation and reconstruction.
• The President’s senior staff and companions are mostly either kinfolk or toadies; he has not seen fit to tap Somali talent from within
the country or the vast diaspora.
It appears, then, that the President has yet to appreciate the full
meaning of reconciliation, peace, and accountability. On the contrary,
many of his words and deeds reiterate his modus operandi in earlier
years and, therefore, indicate that he might not be willing or, worse,
capable of graduating from the status of being the warlord of a region
to the legitimate president of the whole nation. Warlordism connotes
unvarnished egotism, cruelty and suffering—in short, despotism; the
latter’s matrix includes temperance, moderation, reason, and legality
in the carrying out of public duties. Situationally, then, this Somali
moment seems to be ripe for a leadership that can display gestures and
actions that are a convincing prefiguration of the ascent, at last, of conscientious national spirit, programmatic purposefulness, and correlative skills. In his last work of profound meditation on the question of
governance in Africa, Claude Ake had taught that an effective management of the state, let alone its more daunting creation from the ashes of
civil strife, requires a particular approach:
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To tame and democratize it, the state has to be seen as something that
belongs to all and not to some, something which deserves support
for the service it renders, not as a fearsome exploiter or an exploitable
resource.11

This alarming record is aggravated by three other actors who have
failed to meet their obligations. First, Mogadishu-based warlords, who
are members of the Transitional Federal Government, have made only
timid attempts to evacuate some of their militias from the capital as
a result of both pressures brought to bear by the peace movement
and their own calculations to eliminate what they construe to be the
President’s excuse for wanting to relocate the seat of the Government
to Baidoa and Jowhar—two locations where he feels more confident
about the acquiescence of the warlords who control them. Although
the encampment of some of the militias in known places outside of
Mogadishu is a step in the right direction towards minimizing an
explosive encounter, it is insufficient to assuage what might be legitimate anxieties of the President as well as secure the city for the FTG.
More sinisterly, it may very well be the cunning hope of the Mogadishu
warlords that such a tactic will undermine the President’s claim that he
needs regional troops to pacify the capital. Second, the African Union
lacks the financial wherewithal to mobilize the peacekeeping force it
promised to deploy in Mogadishu in order to protect the Government.
Third, the international community, particularly the European Union
that sustained the Somali Conference in Kenya, has been ineffectual to
expedite material support for the AU force. The combination of these
internal and external factors has reduced the probability that peace
will be restored to this land. Depressingly, as of this writing, there
seems to be no forthcoming attempt from the AU or the larger international community to identify the danger and act promptly to break the
logjam.
In contrast to the aforementioned deficits, the Speaker of the Parliament has moved to Mogadishu, as designated by the Charter, and
linked up with the civic and the peace movements in the city. The
two have jointly striven to push forward the process of taming the
capital by swaying the warlords to remove their militias from the city.
It is noteworthy that this effort is being led by women, who are sacrificing their meager resources to feed the cantoned militias. Needless
to say, they cannot sustain that endeavor for too long without major
assistance. It seems, therefore, that the international community, which
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ceded to IGAD the mediative authority (one that in its practical terms
marginalized Somali civic-minded individuals and associations at the
Conference), has now adopted a skeptical attitude towards the Mogadishu-based peace movement. Such a stance at once deflates the confidence of the civic coalitions and emboldens the warlords-cum-leaders.
Recent declarations by President Yusuf that he is intent on mobilizing his militias to move towards Mogadishu, and the warlords’ at best
diffident efforts to locate their armed sectarian groups in common
camps outside of the capital, suggest that the peace process is virtually
dead without major and quick international intervention. The mismanagement of the peace process in Kenya and its corrupt product have
now created conditions that might rekindle the civil war with annihilative consequences. It is bewildering, then, that the AU, IGAD, and the
international community, which publicly claim to support Somalia’s
peaceful reconstruction, are loathe to give a timely and effective hand
to the peace warriors or, perhaps at the same time, impose diplomatic
and material sanctions on those who are eager to continue the reign
of chaos and violence. Having declined to use their immense clout to
advance real peace, members of the international community should be
prepared for another tidal wave of Somali refugees. We urge President
Yusuf, Prime Minister Geedi, and Speaker Sheriff Hassan Sh. Aden to
strictly adhere to the Charter that prescribes the specific authority of
their respective offices. Without such a degree of fidelity to the letter
and spirit of the Charter, a reversion to the malignant mentalité of the
past decade and more is unavoidable. Furthermore, for all three in
particular and the rest of the leading edge of the transition in general,
we alert them to the context that requires a re-moralization of politics
in which ambition is transvalued from vice to virtue. Such a perspective will mean the embrace of dialogical and consensual engagement
as the method of settling contentious issues and of mobilizing the
vast majority for an ennobling and productive transition. Below, we
reproduce the articles of the Transitional Federal Charter that stipulate
the responsibilities of each of the three offices. Finally, we conclude by
reminding everyone of some of the basic principles of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the irreducible basis for even a healthy
pre-modern gemeinschaft, let alone a mature governance fit for the 21st
century. Here, the wisdom of Cicero is worth recalling:
But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there
is no social relation among them all more close, none more dear than

11

Bildhaan Vol. 5

that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear
are children, relatives, friends; but one’s native land embraces all our
loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his
death he could render her service? So much execrable are those monsters
who have torn their fatherland to pieces with every form of outrage and
who are and have been engaged in compassing her utter destruction.12

I. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRESIDENT (Article 44)13
• Address the opening of the Parliament;
• Address a special sitting of Parliament once a year;
• May address Parliament any other time;
• The President shall nominate the President of the Supreme Court
and other Judicial Officers on the proposal of the Council of Ministers;
• The President shall appoint persons to offices in the public service
and heads of government organs on the proposal of the Council of
Ministers;
• The President shall appoint persons to be Ambassadors, Diplomatic
or Consular representatives to foreign countries on the proposal of
the Council of Ministers;
• The President shall receive foreign diplomatic or consular representatives in the country;
• The President shall confer state honours on the proposal of the
Council of Ministers;
• The President shall appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and/or
dismiss the government if it fails to obtain the required vote of confidence from Parliament;
• The President shall dismiss ministers and assistant ministers on the
proposal of the Prime Minister;
• The President shall have authority to sign international treaties on
the proposal of the Council of Ministers and upon ratification by
Parliament;
• The President shall assent and sign into law legislation passed by
the Parliament and regulations and decrees approved by the Council of Ministers.
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II. THE PRIME MINISTER (Articles 45 and 48).
• The executive power shall be vested in the Council of Ministers;
• The Prime Minister shall propose to the President names of persons
to be appointed ministers and assistant ministers;
• The Prime Minister shall propose to the President names of persons
eligible to be appointed as ministers and assistant ministers irrespective of whether he or she is a member of Parliament;
• The Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the Council of
Ministers;
• The Prime Minister shall be responsible for the promotion, co-ordination and supervision of government policy and general administration.
III. THE PARLIAMENT AND THE SPEAKER
(Articles 28, 33, 36, and 38)
• The legislative powers of the Transitional Federal Government of
Somalia shall be vested in Parliament;
• The members of the Parliament shall represent the unity of the
nation;
• Parliament shall elect the President of the TFG;
• Parliament shall elect Speaker and Deputy Speaker;
• Parliament shall make legislation;
• Parliament shall approve and adopt the annual budget;
• Parliament shall consider motions of confidence in the Government;
• Parliament shall make internal parliamentary regulations;
• Parliament shall investigate any matter of public interest;
• Parliament shall hold public hearings;
• Parliament shall ratify international agreements and treaties;
• Parliament shall present to the President for assent any law it
passes;
• Every Parliamentary sitting shall be presided over by the Speaker.
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IV. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
As a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,
to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping
this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal
and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of
Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under
their jurisdiction.
Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which
a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing
or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection
14
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against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against
any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law.
Notes
1. See Abdi Ismail Samatar and Ahmed I. Samatar, eds., The African State: Reconsiderations
(Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 2002).
2. Kenya, the other significant actor, behaved with greater restraint and sensitivity. However, a major blemish on the latter’s dealings was a disappointing proclivity towards
administrative ineptitude on the part of its chief representative and the coordinator of
the Conference.
3. It is reported that some of the presidential candidates paid as much as $3,000 per MP
vote. The great irony is that some of the candidates’ agents took cash and the Quran to
potential vote sellers. The seller, then, was sworn to cast his/her vote for the candidate
who paid for the vote. Impartial witnesses reported that money was “King.” A brutally
honest MP stated, “if money had a father today, he would have wept due to the ease with
which it was squandered.” This suggests that swearing on the Quran for these MPs had
no sacred meaning. In this context, what possible value would the swearing in of the
new president have for upright citizens?
4. Here is how a witness described the problem: “At the end of the 3-year term on July 30,
2001, none of the mandated tasks was carried out. No plausible reason(s) were offered
for the noncompliance. The government of Col. Abdillahi Yusuf’s mandate hence expired
for all practical purposes. But Col. Yusuf was not ready to abide by the provisions of the
law and to relinquish office. Instead, he began to unceremoniously insist on obtaining
another three-year mandate, and refused to hand over responsibility to the Chief Justice, as set by the Charter…In the meantime, the Chief Justice of the region convened a
constitutional conference, as provided for in the Charter, within the established period
of 30 days, the same procedure with which Col. Abdillahi Yusuf and his Vice-President
were elected three years earlier. At the end of a long debate, the conference elected on
November 10, 2001, Col. Jama Ali Jama…for a three-year term…Rather than complying with the law and the wishes of the people, Col. Yusuf opted for employing illegal
maneuvers…including the use of force and acts of terror and violence. He refused to
recognize the newly elected president and declared himself as the ‘legitimate president.’
After the election of the new president, Col. Yusuf soon amassed a formidable armed
force with the help of Ethiopia and preemptively attacked the peaceful city of Boosaaso,
killing at least 14 innocent civilians and injuring more than 48…Col. Yusuf and his
militia force of about 300 people with 17 so-called technicals…led by himself landed on
Garowe and immediately attacked a residential villa, where the newly elected President,
Col. Jama, was staying. The attack was a surprise. Eleven innocent civilians were killed
and 31 others injured. The main target, Col. Jama, luckily escaped unharmed…About a
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month later, Col. Yusuf launched another attack on Garowe. This time around, the main
target was a prominent and highly respected businessman, Farah Dheere, whose crime
was that he opposed Col. Yusuf. While driving his car, the targeted victim was assailed
and murdered in cold blood by armed militia.” Unpublished Report. Boosaaso, January
2003.
5. It is worth noting that a case is pending in a British court in which Col. Yusuf is
accused of masterminding the murder of Sultan Hurre. It is reported that Col. Yusuf
admitted that his bodyguards killed the Sultan (Case No: HQ02X03221 Supreme Court
of England and Wales). It has been reported that Yusuf lost the first round and was asked
to pay nearly $30,000 in court and other costs.
6. Ahmed I. Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Somali Reconciliation: Editorial Note,”
Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 3 (2003): 1–15.
7. President Yusuf has made a quick reference to the need for forgetting about the past
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